# **YOLO** Frequently Resetting CPS for Security

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# YOLO

# You Only Live Once



### Cyber-Physical Systems = Cyber + Physical




## **CPS Characteristics** (vs Cyber)

- More vulnerable to attacks
  - Not designed for security
  - Slow to no upgrades
- More difficult to recover from failures
  - Replacing hardware is non-trivial









## **CPS Characteristics** (vs Cyber)

- Resilient by design
  - Redundancy against unintentional failures/faults






# **Key Research Question** Can we take advantage of unique CPS properties to protect them against security attacks?

#### YOLO in a nutshell

- Leverage *physical* characteristics of CPS to ensure *cyber* security.
- Flexible framework that can be integrated for a varying spectrum of systems.



#### YOLO: Threat Model

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




#### YOLO: Threat Model


- Attacker's intention is to gain a foothold into the system.
- An attacker has complete knowledge of the system internals.
- An attacker's sphere of influence is bounded.









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
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
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  - Prevents an adversary's ability to corrupt the system.
    - Bounded time horizon over which an attacker can affect the system.




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
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
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
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
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
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
• Why does this work for CPS?





Inertia Allows system to continue operation.





Feedback The state of the system can be observed.












• For YOLO to win: reset interval < time for an attacker's effects to manifest.



- Persistent malware is denied (RESET step)
  - Memory is wiped clean.

Increased work for the attacker (DIVERSIFY step)
Inputs have to be crafted to exploit each variant.


#### Rest of the talk...


Case Study 1: Engine Control Unit (ECU) Case Study 2: Flight Controller (FCU)



#### Case Study - **ECU** How it works


Four-stroke cycle





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#### Case Study - **ECU**



• rusEFI: Open Source ECU

• C/C++

- Honda CBR600RR Engine
- Cortex M4 @168 MHz
  - 192 KB SRAM
  - 1 MB Flash


#### Case Study - **ECU** Reset Strategy

- Power cycle.
  - Externally triggerable.
  - Clears RAM & peripheral state.



#### Case Study - **ECU** Diversify Strategy


- Build off technique called *Isomeron* [1].
  - Execution-path randomization.
  - Compile-time implementation.



Program Control Flow Graph


#### Case Study - **ECU** YOLO Performance

**Effects of Resets on Engine Speed** 




Reset Downtime (ms)

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
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
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Reset Downtime (ms)


#### Case Study - **ECU** YOLO Performance



Reset Downtime (ms)

## Case Study - Flight Controller

#### Case Study - **Flight Controller** How it works



## Case Study - Flight Controller




• PX4: Open Source FC


• C/C++

- DJI F450 Flamewheel
- Cortex M4 @168 MHz
  - 192 KB SRAM
  - 1 MB Flash


- Snapshot & Restore
  - Pre-initialized state for fast startup




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


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
## Case Study - **Flight Controller** Diversify Strategy

• Randomized Stack Canaries




## Case Study - **Flight Controller** Diversify Strategy


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


#### Case Study - **Flight Controller** YOLO Performance



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#### Summary

- CPS properties can strengthen security.
- Eliminates malware from a system (RESET step).
- Increased work for an attacker (DIVERSIFY step).

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# Questions?

#### Intentionally Left Blank

## YOLO: Limitations & Mitigations

- Multiple Interacting Components
  - Timing and communications challenges may be mitigated by a microreboot like approach [2].
- Temporary loss of control
  - Replication & Interleaved resets can help alleviate this issue.
- Orthogonal Concerns
  - Spoofed inputs, algorithm stability, etc solutions can be layered with YOLO.